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ABSTRACT
NLR currently co-develops a civil avionics application that connects
aircraft subsystems with the aircraft flight deck by means of modern
digital data buses. It combines, controls, processes and forwards the
data between the subsystems and flight deck. High reliability of these
functions is required to ensure the safety of the aircraft. For this kind
of applications certification is required by an independent, government
authorised, third party. Guidelines for this certification are documented
in the 
DO-178B standard: software considerations in airborne systems and
equipment certification. 
This paper describes practical experiences with DO-178B. The software
development methodology used to guarantee the reliability,
maintainability, safety and cerifiability of the product in a commercial
environment is discussed. Requirements volatility and short time-to-
market characterise the commercial reality.
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Abstract
NLR currently co-develops a civil avionics application that connects aircraft subsystems with the
aircraft flight deck by means of modern digital data buses. It combines, controls, processes and
forwards the data between the subsystems and flight deck. High reliability of these functions is
required to ensure the safety of the aircraft. For this kind of applications certification is required
by an independent, government authorised, third party. Guidelines for this certification are
documented in the
DO-178B standard: software considerations in airborne systems and equipment certification.
This paper describes practical experiences with DO-178B. The software development
methodology used to guarantee the reliability, maintainability, safety and certifiability of the
product in a commercial environment is discussed. Requirement volatility and short
time-to-market characterise the commercial reality.
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1 Introduction
To fly aircraft under all (adverse) conditions, pilots must fully rely on the data presented to
them, and on the correct and timely forwarding of their commands to the relevant aircraft
subsystems. The avionics application connects these subsystems with the aircraft flight deck by
means of modern digital data buses. It combines, controls, processes and forwards the data
between the subsystems and the flight deck. High reliability of these functions is required to
ensure the safety of the aircraft. In this paper the experiences with the software development
methods to meet these requirements in a commercial environment are presented.
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2 Air transport safety requirements
For safety critical software in airborne equipment the (DO-178B 1992) standard has been
developed. The aim of this document is to provide guidance to both the software developers and
the certification authorities. Usually acceptance of software is based on an agreement between
the developer and the customer. In civil avionics an independent third party, the certification
authority, performs the ultimate system acceptance by certifying the entire aircraft. It is only then
that the constituent software is airworthy and can be considered ready for use in the aircraft
concerned. (DO-178B 1992) provides a world wide "level playing field" for the competing
industries as well as a world wide protection of the air traveller, which are important due to the
international character of the industry. The certification authority is a national governmental
institution which in our case delegated some of its technical activities to a specialised company.
2.1 Safety classification
Based on the impact of the system failure the software failure can contribute to, the software is
classified into 5 levels. The following is a verbatim copy of the (DO-178B 1992) text. The
failure probability in flight hours (i.e. actual operating hours) according to the Federal Aviation
Requirements /Joint Aviation Requirements(FAR/JAR-25) has been added.
Level A: Catastrophic failure
Failure conditions which would prevent continued safe flight and landing
(FAR/JAR-25) extremely improbable, < 1x10-9
Level B: Hazardous/Severe-Major failure
Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to
cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be:
- a large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities
- physical distress or higher workload such that the flight crew could not be relied on to
perform their tasks accurately or completely
- adverse effect on occupants including serious or potentially fatal injuries to a small number
of those occupants
(FAR/JAR-25) extremely remote, 1x10-9 < hazardous failure < 1x10-7
Level C: Major failure
Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the aircraft or the ability of the crew to
cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example,
- a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities
- a significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impairing crew efficiency or
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- discomfort to occupants, possibly including injuries
(FAR/JAR-25) remote, 1x10-7 < major failure < 1x10-5
Level D: Minor failure
Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce aircraft safety and which would involve
crew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions may include for
example,
- a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities
- a slight increase in crew workload, such as, routine flight plan changes, or some
inconvenience to occupants
(FAR/JAR-25) probable, minor failure > 1x10-5
Level E: No Effect
Failure conditions which do not affect the operational capability of the aircraft or increase crew
workload.
The following text will only consider the part of the avionics application which is classified as
level A.
2.2 Software life cycle
(DO-178B 1992) on purpose refrains from making a statement about an appropriate software life
cycle. The life cycle is described rather abstract as a number of processes that are categorised
as follows
- software planning process which entails the production of the following documents
plan for software aspects of certification. The main purpose of this document is to
define the compliance of the software development process to (DO-178B 1992) for the
certification authorities. This document contains many references to the project
documentation generated as part of the life cycle model used,
software development plan, which defines the chosen software life cycle and the
software development environment, including all tools used,
software verification plan, which defines the means by which the verification objectives
will be met,
software configuration management plan
software quality assurance plan.
- software development processes consisting of
software requirement process,
software design process,
software coding process,
integration process.
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Each software development process has to be traceable, verifiable and consistent. Transition
criteria need to be defined by the developer to determine whether the next software
development process may be started.
- integral processes which are divided into
software verification process,
software configuration management process,
software quality assurance process,
certification liaison process.
The integral processes are a result of the criticality of the software. Consequently the
integral processes are performed concurrently with the software development processes
throughout the entire software life cycle.
2.3 Verification
Verification is defined as "the evaluation of the results of a process to ensure correctness and
consistency with respect to the inputs and standards to that process". Verification can be
accomplished by review, analysis, test or any combination of these 3 activities. Review provides
a qualitative assessment of correctness.
Analysis is a detailed examination of a software component. It is a repeatable process that can
be supported by tools. (DO-178B 1992) recognises two types of tool
- software development tools, which can introduce errors,
- software verification tools, which can fail to detect errors.
The avionics project has only developed software verification tools. Every tool needs to be
verified against the Tool Operational Requirements, the contents of which is prescribed in
(DO-178B 1992). Software development tools need to be tested using normal and abnormal
conditions. Software verification tools need only be tested using normal conditions. For software
tools the same documentation and configuration control procedures apply as for the airborne
software. Every software tool needs approval of the certification authority.
Testing is "the process of exercising a system or system components to verify that it satisfies
specified requirements and to detect errors". By definition the actual testing of deliverable
software forms only part of the verification of the coding and integration processes.
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3 Experience gained with safety critical software development
Usually the software development process is agreed between the customer and the supplier. For
certifiable software a third party is involved, adding a stage in the approval process. The
organisational independence improves the position of the assessors. In the our case the customer
had ample experience with (DO-178B 1992) certification and decided, after approving the
process documentation, to postpone the review with the certification authorities until the
completion of the coding process. Only minor modifications were needed in the process
documents, implying that (DO-178B 1992) can be adhered to without prior knowledge of
certification.
The project team was set up consisting of 2 separate groups, a development group and a
verification group. The verification group was headed by a team member with sufficient
authority to report, at his own discretion, to the company management outside the project
hierarchy.
To ensure strict traceability from requirements to design, to code and to integration a review was
development process. Experience with previous mission critical software development suggested
variability of detailed system requirements, so analysis is used wherever possible. Part of the
analysis can be strictly defined and subsequently implemented in a customised tool. Tool support
reduces the costs for repeated analysis. The software verification tools performed according to
expectations to reduce the impact (both in time and costs) of the many late requirements changes
(fig 2).
The customer required use of the C programming language was considered a potential risk for
the successful development of the avionics application. The C language contains numerous
constructs that are unspecified, undefined or left to be defined by the compiler supplier (Hatton
1995). This risk was reduced by choosing an ANSI-C compliant compiler complemented by a
project coding standard defining, amongst others, a safe subset of C. Compliance to this project
coding standard can be checked automatically by customising a commercial tool. During
verification of this tool the version management by the tool supplier turned out to be inadequate.
The tool was already marketed world wide since 1986 to hundreds of customers. This illustrates
the rigour of the applied verification processes.
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4 Overview of the avionics application
The aircraft display subsystem is designed to operate in both Visual Meteorological Conditions
(VMC) and Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). Under visual meteorological conditions
the displays aid the pilot during flight, under instrument meteorological conditions the displays are
necessary for the pilot to be able to fly, consequently the correct functioning of the displays is
safety critical. The latter conditions imply that a number of equipment items needs to be
duplicated to achieve the required failure probability.
When configured for instrument meteorological conditions the displays consist of the following
equipment
- 2 avionics control display application systems, containing the avionics application,
- 4 smart multifunction displays,
- 2 instrument control panels,
- 1 reconfiguration control unit.
The avionics application is the interface between the on-board sensors and the displays (fig. 1).
The sensors and some aircraft subsystems send flight parameters via digital buses to the avionics
application, which validates the parameters and sends them to the displays. A number of flight 
parameters is also computed within the avionics application itself.
Flight Deck
Automatic
Direction Finder
Distance Measuring
Equipment
Radio Altimeter
VOR/ILS Equipment
- VHF Omni directional Range
- Instrument Landing System
Weather Radar
Control Panel
Sensors
Auto Pilot Module
Centralised
Maintenance Manager
Navigation Module
- GPS Global Positioning System
- FMS Flight Management System
Vehicle and Engine
Management System
Video Radar Module
- forward looking infrared
- digital map generator
- weather radar
Aircraft Subsystems
Air Data Computer
Attitude & Heading
Reference System
SSR Transponder
- Secondary Surveillance Radar
Sensors & Outputs
Avionics Control
Display Application
Instrument
Control Panel
Smart Multifunction
Display
Reconfiguration
Control Unit
Fig.1 Overview avionics control display application environment
During normal operation the avionics application processes about 100 different flight parameters,
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In case of failure of an equipment item or a discrepancy between two sensors, the
reconfiguration control unit permits the crew to choose between different display configurations.
When a sensor is reconfigured, it is logically switched-off. This illustrates how software and a
duplicated hardware device reduce the failure rate to the required level. Consequently the
software becomes safety critical.
During normal operation the avionics application processes about 100 different flight parameters,
originating from 10 different sensors. The delay times within the avionics application should be
guaranteed to be less then 30 msec.
Each parameter is classified as
- critical: loss or undetected error could lead to a catastrophic failure condition. Examples of
critical parameters are the attitude parameters pitch, roll, and heading. The software that
handles these parameters is classified as (DO-178B 1992) level A,
- essential: loss or undetected error could lead to a major failure condition. An example of
an essential parameter is the VOR (VHF Omnibearing Range for aircraft position
determination). The software that handles these parameters is classified as level B,
- non-essential: loss or undetected error could lead to a minor failure condition. Examples of
these parameters are the long term navigation parameters, like the flight plan. The software
that handles these parameters is classified as level D.
Depending on the criticality of the flight parameter, validation is performed by the avionics
application in four different ways
- coherency test: a check on correct length and parity of the data,
- reception test: a check on the timely arrival of the data,
- sensor discrepancy test: a comparison between two data values produced by the two
independent redundant sensors,
- module discrepancy test: a comparison between the two parameter values produced by the
same sensor; one value directly read by the system from the sensor, and one obtained from
the redundant system via a cross-talk bus.
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5 Experience gained with safety critical software development methods
The definition of the avionics application software development method has been guided by
previous experience with mission critical software. In spacecraft the software on which success
of a mission depends is classified as mission critical.
5.1 Previous experience
The Attitude and Orbit Control System (AOCS) software for the Italian-Dutch Astronomical
X-ray Satellite (SAX) (Dekker 1996) has been developed using the following software
development method
- customer supplied specifications provided in plain English,
- use of the (ESA PSS-05, 1991), life cycle model,
- requirement analysis using Structured Analysis with Hatley and Pirbhai Real Time system
extensions (SA/RT) (Hatley & Pirbhai 1988) supported by the Teamwork tool. The process-
specifications are written in plain English, including a copy of the relevant requirement
number(s),
- software design using Yourdon Structured Design (SD) supported by the Teamwork tool.
The module-specifications are written in pseudo code and include a copy of the relevant
requirement number(s),
- coding in the customer prescribed C-language. A proprietary C-coding standard was used,
enhanced for this specific project. The coding standard provides a uniform coding style,
improving readability, maintainability and modifiability. Based on experience in many
project recommended constructs are provided an unwanted constructs are prohibited. Project
enhancements include no recursion (to prevent unpredictable maximum execution times) and
no dynamic memory allocation (to prevent unpredictable maximum memory size).
The entire structured design module- specification was included as comment in the code,
- module testing and integration testing with a self imposed 100% code coverage requirement.
After validation and delivery the resulting system contained 1 error in 20,000 lines of
non-comment source-code. This error was found during the SAX satellite integration tests plus
the entire operational life of the satellite. The resulting error density is 0.05 error per 1000 lines
of code. This can be categorised as an extremely low value, refer also to (Hatton 1996). This
error density was achieved even though the first delivery consisted of 16,000 lines of code and
subsequently about 8,000 lines of code were added/modified resulting in a total size of 20,000
lines of code.
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5.2 Method used
For the avionics application the customer prescribed the use of the (DOD-STD-2167A, 1988)
life cycle model and the use of the C-language. Based on the successful SAX AOCS
development the following elements of the SAX AOCS software development method are
retained
- customer supplied specifications provided in plain English,
- requirements analysis using Structured Analysis/Real Time systems supported by the
Teamwork tool,
- software design using structured design supported by the Teamwork tool,
- use of NLR proprietary C-coding standard, with project specific enhancements, including
the ones described for the SAX AOCS project. The C-coding standard is enforced by a
static source code analysis tool.
Based on the SAX-AOCS experience of a very substantial amount of changes during and after
the implementation phase, even more emphasis is placed on tools to support the development
activities. Added to the software development method are
- a mandatory 100% code coverage for software classified at (DO-178B 1992) level A. This
code coverage consists of statement coverage (every statement executed) plus decision
coverage (every decision executed for pass and fail) plus the modified condition/ decision
coverage (mc/dc). Mc/dc requires that for every condition in a decision, its effect on the
outcome of the decision is demonstrated,
- the use of an automated test tool to aid the construction and cost effective repetition of the
functional tests and code coverage tests. Only for code coverage tests the source code has
to be instrumented by the test tool,
- execution of module tests and integration tests on the target system. The test tool is used
to generate test harnesses in the C programming language, which can be (cross-)compiled
and run on the host computer or the target computer. The advantage is that the source code
can be tested without having the target computer available.
5.3 Formal methods
Formal methods with comprehensive automated environments could provide benefits in safety
critical environments. However such automatic verification systems, including sufficient vendor
support, are not yet available for real world applications. Formal methods can provide important
evidence for certification. However certification must consider multiple sources of evidence and
ultimately rests on informed engineering judgement and experience (Kopetz, 1997). (DO-178B
1992) does not consider formal proofs an alternative to the recommended methods, but allows
its use for satisfying some of the documents objectives.
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6 Commercial realities versus safety critical application development
Due to the commercially defined short time to market, the customer definition of the system
requirements was performed concurrently with the software requirements process. The resulting
analysis was subjected to a number of informal technical assessments, but no formal verification
was performed.
6.1 Co-development necessity
The commercial nature of the aircraft development even resulted in concurrent updates of the
system requirements during the design, coding and integration processes. Consequently the
planned deployment of separate development and integration teams turned out to be infeasible.
To aid the integration of the avionics application in the customer developed displays and
subsequently in the existing aircraft, a first version of the software with very limited
functionality was delivered. This version was produced based on a successive completion of the
documented software development processes. However none of the formal reviews with the
customer or the certification authority had been performed. The first version served its purpose
well. A lot of feed-back was obtained, resulting in many changes to and clarifications of the
system requirements.
Due to the success in eliminating system level problems by the informal co-development of the
first version of the avionics application and the displays, the customer requested to continue the
informal co-development and allocate all project resources to it. The personnel resources of both
teams were combined, however the 2 separate team managers with their complementary
responsibilities remained. All activities were executed for only one of the teams. The respective
team leader ensure that the relevant procedures remain strictly enforced.
6.2 Requirement volatility
The steady rise in the number of implemented requirements (fig 2) shows that from a functional
point of view this concentrated development effort has been very successful. At least 1 additional
pre-release is expected. Up to date the software contains nearly all functions for the nominal
behaviour. At the same time the number of requirements changes, almost all of which have been
accommodated, equals the number of requirements (fig 2). These changes relate in part to
valuable feed-back from the user (pilot). Most remaining changes are caused by the co-
development of the displays and especially the integration of the displays with the avionics
application and the aircraft. This integration has been expedited considerably by the pre-releases.
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Fig. 2 Requirement implementation status (cumulative) and number of changed requirements
6.3Incremental deliveries
The avionics application consists of 4 configuration items, 3 programme modules and 1 shared
library module. By far the most requirements are implemented in Module C. Between the first and
the second delivery many functions from module B were moved to the shared library (fig. 3)
because of modified requirements combined with a consolidation of the design of both modules.
Between the second and third delivery the same occurred for modules A and B/C. Between the
third and the last delivery mainly additional requirements are implemented in module C with some
additional module consolidation. Between the second and third delivery, the execution time was
considerably reduced by optimising the architecture design.
week 0 week 12 week 20 week 24
module A module B module C shared
Code size
Fig. 3 Module code size per pre-release, cumulative
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6.4 Co-development experience
This informal co-development has only been possible because the documented software
requirement process and software design process had been completed before the coding of the
first software version started. The available Teamwork models also aided in assessing the
consequences of proposed changes. The drawback of the informal co-development is that a very
considerable amount of documentation work remains. Based on the software size it was
impossible to enlarge the team. Also all verification and the exhaustive mc/dc testing still needs
to be performed. It is inevitable that the verification will result in a new version of the software,
which will be submitted to the certification authorities. The reverse side of the early and
successful delivery of the co-development versions is the risk of invalidating some already
completed flight trials of the aircraft.
Safety critical avionics applications require independent personnel to verify the coding and
integration processes. Consequently another person needs intimate knowledge of each module
as well as an up-to-date detailed design to verify the implementation. The commercial pressure
to implement requirements in the next pre-release, combined with the labour intensive Teamwork
tool to update the analysis and design models results in both models to become rapidly outdated.
Consequently the verification can not keep up with the co-development.
After the last pre-release delivery costly re-work needs to be done, which also delays the
certification schedule. It is unclear how much of the schedule time gained during the
co-development is lost due to the resulting delayed verification and certification. At least
co-development saves re-certification effort as well as the generation, formal release and formal
review of much documentation describing pre-releases. An important lesson learned from the
informal co-development is to try to keep the verification process up with the actual
implementation to comply with the commercial time to market.
The many system requirement changes require a cheap and easily repeatable verification process.
This can only be achieved by using strictly defined development methods which allow strictly
defined analysis. The well defined analysis should be executed by automated tools. These tools
should be sufficiently user-friendly and efficient to allow the analysis, design and testing to be
updated concurrently with the code modifications resulting in a spiral development model. As
a complete integrated suite of development tools is not commercially available, the best option
is to use as much available tools as possible. For some simple unsupported (verification) tasks
proprietary tools can be produced cost-effectively. Only the tool for checking compliance to the
coding standard was sufficiently user-friendly to be used during the co-development.
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7 Conclusion
For air transport the safety requirements stated in (DO-178B 1992) software are sufficiently clear
to allow a first-time developer to define, without external support, a compliant development
process. Compliance can be achieved with the traditional waterfall software development model.
Producing aircraft is a commercial venture i.e. the various aircraft subsystems need to be
co-developed in order to achieve the commercial determined time to market. In this environment
the spiral model is more appropriate then the waterfall model.
An integrated tool set is needed to support the co-development i.e. which allows when a change
occurs to concurrently update analysis, design, code, integration and verification (including
traceability information). Currently commercial available tools do not provide this capability.
To minimise the effort of the recurring verification, analysis is the preferred method, supported
by tools wherever available. For simple verification tasks customised tools can be developed
cost-effectively.
The commercial need to deploy all human resources to development has significantly reduced
the development time as well as allowed co-development of the avionics application with several
other aircraft subsystems.
It can not be assessed whether this time reduction is offset by the resulting delay in updating the
documentation and certification. Performing these iterations before certification at least avoids
the re-certification costs of the intermediate versions.
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